

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4909

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

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LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, EG, UR, US, XF, XG

SUBJECT: QUARTERLY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT: APRIL 1 - JUNE 30, 1975

REF: CAIRO 3310

SUMMARY: FORD/SADAT SALZBURG SUMMIT WAS QUARTER'S FOCAL POINT  
AND PROVIDED MUCH NEEDED BOOST TO GOE CONFIDENCE IN US  
INTENTIONS VIS-A-VIS ME PEACE SETTLEMENT. GOE ALSO TOOK HEART  
FROM ISRAELI PRESS REPORTS THAT FORD/RABIN MEETING DID NOT GO  
WELL, BUT IS STILL UNABLE UNDERSAND WHY US CANNOT BRING  
RECALCITRANT PROTEGE TO HEEL. RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS REMAIN  
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POOR. SOVIET REFUSAL REPLACE OCTOBER MILITARY LOSSES OR

RESCHEDULE DEBT AND NEW SOVIET-LIBYAN ARMS DEAL CONFIRMED  
SADAT'S BELIEF THAT SOVIETS OUT TO GET HIM. IN ARAB  
ARENA, SADAT IS CONVINCED QADHAAFI IS DANGEROUS LUNATIC;  
HE IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED OVER RAPIDLY DETERIORATING  
SITUATION IN LEBANON. HE WAS SUCCESSFUL IN ACHIEVING  
MEASURE OF ARAB CONSENSUS RE ME NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO  
SALZBURG SUMMIT, BUT DESPITE SURFACE RAPPROACHMENT WITH ASAD,  
CANNOT SHAKE DISTRUST OF SYRIANS. SADAT IS PLEASED WITH  
GROWING STRENGTH OF GOE POSITION IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS. ON  
DOMESTIC SCENE, INSTALLATION OF NEW CABINET, DESIGNATION OF  
MUBARAK AS NEW VP AND REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL DOMINATE  
QUARTER. SERIOUS LIQUIDITY AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS  
COULD NO LONGER BE IGNORED. END SUMMARY.

1. FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY CAIRO'S QUARTERLY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT  
FOR APRIL 1 - JUNE 30, 1975. PART I, EGYPTIAN FOREIGN  
AFFAIRS, IS DIVIDED INTO SUBSECTIONS ON GOE RELATIONS WITH USG,  
USSR, ARABS, EUROPE AND OTHERS. PART II DISCUSSES INTERNAL  
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION.

PART I. FOREIGN AFFAIRS: A. US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS:  
MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS FORD AND SADAT AT SALZBURG IN JUNE  
HIGHLIGHTED QUARTER. BREAKDOWN OF US EFFORT IN MARCH TO  
OBTAIN A SECOND STAGE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT THREATENED NEW  
DRIFT IN VOLATILE ME SITUATION AND POSED MAJOR POLICY  
QUESTIONS FOR SADAT. FACED WITH RECURRENT NEED TO JUSTIFY TO  
HIS CRITICS AT HOME AND ABROAD BENEFITS OF HIS PRO-US POLICY,  
HE SEIZED OCCASION OF FUNERAL CEREMONIES FOR KING FAISAL IN  
RIYADH TO DISCUSS WITH VP ROCKEFELLER EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT  
SADAT MEET WITH PRESIDENT FORD IN SOME NEUTRAL COUNTRY; SADAT  
STRESSED SUMMIT SHOULD PRODUCE CONCRETE RESULTS. CONCURRENTLY,  
ANNOUNCEMENT OF REASSESSMENT OF US MIDDLE EAST POLICY BROUGHT  
TIME FOR BOTH GOE AND USG AND BUOYED EGYPTIAN HOPES. KEYNOTE  
OF THE US REASSESSMENT, IN EGYPTIAN EYES, WAS PRESIDENT FORD'S  
CRITICISM OF ISRAELI "INFLEXIBILITY". PROTRACTED DELAY IN  
ANNOUNCING RESULTS OF REASSESSMENT AROUSED SOME MISGIVINGS,  
BUT VISIBLY STRAINED US-ISRAELI RELATIONS WERE READ AS WELCOME  
SUPPORT FOR EGYPTIAN STANCE. COEVALLY, EGYPTIANS FOUND  
ISRAELI'S REFUSAL TO SUCCUMB PUZZLING AND ARGUED US SHOULD APPLY  
MORE PRESSURE TO BRING ISRAEL TO HEEL.

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3. PRIOR TO SALZBURG, SADAT REPEATEDLY STATED HE WOULD ATTEND  
SUMMIT SIMPLY TO LISTEN TO WHAT USG HAD TO OFFER. BUT ON EVE  
OF SALZBURG TALKS, EGYPTIANS WERE TYPICALLY APPREHENSIVE  
ABOUT WHAT MIGHT EMERGE. ALREADY FEARFUL LEST MORE CONCESSIONS  
BE SOUGHT FROM SADAT, THEY NOW WONDERED WHETHER USG HANDS WERE  
TIED, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE PRO-ISRAELI LETTER OF THE 76  
SENATORS. EGYPTIANS WERE STUNNED BY PUBLICATION OF THAT

LETTER, PARTICULARLY AFTER THEY HAD DEVOTED MUCH EFFORT AND HOSPITALITY TO NUMEROUS CONGRESSIONAL VISITORS IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM A MORE BALANCED APPRECIATION OF THE ARAB-ISARELI DISPUTE.

4. IN FACT, SALZBURG SUMMIT WENT FAMOUSLY. NOT ONLY DID THE TWO PRESIDENTS GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER, BUT ALL INDICATIONS POINT TO FACT THEY LIKED EACH OTHER. SADAT CAME AWAY CONVINCED PRESIDENT FORD IS FIRM IN HIS ANNOUNCED DETERMINATION NOT TO PERMIT STALEMATE OR STAGNATION TO DEVELOP IN PEACEMAKING PROCESS. DESPITE CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE, SUMMIT TALKS RENEWED SENSE OF EGYTIAN CONFIDENCE IN US INTENTIONS. HOWEVER, GIVEN MERCURIAL EGYPTIAN TEMPERAMENT, DEMONSTRABLE PROGRESS IS NECESSARY BEFORE LONG TO SUSTAIN THAT CONFIDENCE.

5. SUBSEQUENT RABIN TALKS IN WASHINGTON WERESCRUTINIZED WITH KEEN INTEREST. DOMINANT QUESTION IN EGYPTIAN MINDS WAS WHETHER USG HAD MANAGED TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY. ISRAELI PRESS STATEMENTS SOON MADE IT CLEAR THIS WAS NOT THE CASE, THOUGH RASH OF CONCURRENT PRESS STORIES OUT OF JERUSALEM SIGNALING NEW STRAINS IN US-ISRAELI RELATIONS ASSUAGED SOMEWHAT EGYPTIANDISAPPOINTMENT AND SHOWED US WAS TRYING. SADAT STILL LOOKS TO USG TO ACT AS MEDIATOR TO MOVE ARAB-ISARELI DISPUTE CLOSER TO A JUST AND DURABLE SOLUTION AND HAS TOLD PRESSMEN A US PROPOSAL IS NOW NEEDED. MEANWHILE, LOCAL PRESS HAS ELLIPTICALLY REPORTED EGYPTIAN COUNTER PROPOSAL OFFERED TO KEEP BALL IN PLAY.

6. ON ANOTHER PLANE, USG ENGAGED ITSELF IN ORGANIZE MULTI-LATERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR EGYPT TO ENABLE GOE TO OVERCOME ITS SERIOUS LIQUIDITY AND BUDGETARY DEFICIT PROBLEM. UNDERSECRETARY ROBINSON THRICE VISITED EGYPT DURING THE  
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QUARTER TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT. US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR EGYPT ACCELERATED DURING THE QUARTER WITH SINGING OF VARIOUS DOCUMENTS, INCLUDING CONCESSIONARY SALE OF 350 THOUSAND TONS OF PL-480 WHEAT, A NEW \$70 MILLION CIP LOAN, ROAD BUILDING EQUIPMENT, AND THE INITIATION OF GRAIN SILO CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. THESE AGREEMENTS, ALL CAREFULLY STAGED, RECEIVED FAVORABLE EGYPTIN PUBLICITY.

7. SYMBOLIZING US-EGYPTIAN RELATIONSHIP, GOE INVITED COMSIXTHFLEET FLAGSHIP, USS LITTLE ROCK, WITH VICE ADMIRAL TURNER ABOARD, TO PARTICIPATE IN SUEZ CANAL REOPENING PROCESSION. TO CHAGRIN OF SOVIETS AND OF OUR BRITISH AND FRENCH ALLIES, SHE WAS ONLY FOREIGN WARSHIP IN THE CONVOY AND EVOKED MUCH COMMENT. LITTLE ROCK THEN INVITED TO MAKE A THREE-DAY OPERATIONAL VISIT TO ALEXANDRIA, WHERE SADAT RECEIVED TURNER.

8. B. EGYPTIAN/SOVIET RELATIONS: ON SURFACE, BREAKDOWN OF SECOND PHASE DISENGAGEMENT TALKS OFFERED EXPLOITABLE OPPORTUNITY, BUT SOVIETS UNABLE CAPITALIZE ON IT AND FARED POORLY. FAHMY WAS INVITED IN MID-APRIL TO VISIT MOSCOW, WHERE HE OBTAINED SOVIET AGREEMENT TO SEPARATE DEBT REPAYMENT ISSUE FROM RESUMPTION OF LIMITED SOVIET INDUSTRIAL/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TO PROCEED WITH LONG DELAYED OVERHAUL OF EAF ENGINES. IN RETURN, FAHMY ACQUIESCED IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE FORMULATION STIPULATING ALL FURTHER STEPS TOWARD PEACE

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INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

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USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY KWUAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

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SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING PARTIAL STEPS, SHOULD TAKE PLACE SOLELY IN FRAMEWORK GENEVA CONFERENCE, I.E., WITH SOVIET

PARTICIPATION. BUT FAHMY ALSO RETURNED WITH CLEAR IMPRESSION THAT SOVIETS WORRIED THEY MIGHT HAVE TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR POTENTIAL FAILURE AT GENEVA. STRESSING NEED FOR CAREFUL PREPARATION FOR GENEVA, SOVIETS REVERSED EARLIER PUBLIC POSITION AND COUNSELLED INTERIM AGREEMENT NEGOTIATED AT GENEVA LIKELY BE OPTIMUM OBTAINABLE AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS CONTINUED PUBLICLY ENDORSE GENEVA FORUM, HEAT WAS OFF FOR EARLY RECONVENING OF CONFERENCE. EGYPTIANS ARE MINDFUL SOVIETS HAVE LITTLE MEANINGFUL TO OFFER TO ADVANCE PEACEMAKING PROCESS.

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9. FAHMY'S LIMITED SUCCESS FOUNDERED, AS IT HAS SO OFTEN, ON SADAT'S ANTI-SOVIET PHOBIA. SHORTLY AFTER FONMIN'S RETURN, SADAT GAVE PUBLIC ADDRESS AGAIN BLASTING SOVIETS FOR FAILING TO REPLACE OCTOBER WAR LOSSES AND AGREE TO DEBT REPAYMENT MORATORIUM. SOVIET-LIBYAN ARMS DEAL FURTHER SOURED SOVIET-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS. SADAT, ESPITE REPEATED SOVIET DENIALS, CHARGED SOVIETS AGREED TO SUPPLY LIBYA WITH \$12 BILLION IN ARMS, AND WITH QADHAAFI'S CONNIVANCE PLANNED TO ESTABLISH SOVIET-MANNED MILITARY BASES ON LIBYAN TERRITORY. HIS CLAIM TO DOLLAR VALUE OF ARMS IS EXAGGERATED, BUT HIS DWELLING ON SUBJECT REFLECTS HIS DEEP CONVICTION THAT NEW SOVIET-LIBYAN RELATIONSHIP IS A DIRECT THREAT TO EGYPT. SOVIETS, SADAT BELIEVES, ARE OUT TO BRING HIM DOWN BY HOOK OR BY CROOK.

10. SYMBOLICALLY, SOVIET HUMILIATION WAS COMPLETE WITH USS LITTLE ROCK INCIDENT. ON PRACTICAL LEVEL, MOST DISTURBING TO SOVIETS WAS SADAT'S ORDER THAT EGYPTIAN NAVY NOT RESPOND TO ROUTINE SOVIET REQUEST TO USE SALLUM AND MERSA MATRUH NAVAL FACILITIES, WHICH THEY HAVE LONG ENJOYED. ALEXANDRIA FACILITIES APPARENTLY STILL REMAIN OPEN TO THEM, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT THESE TOO MAY BE TAKEN AWAY. HYPERSENSITIVE AS THEY ARE, SOVIETS ARE CURRENTLY EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT SADAT INTENDS TO OFFER NAVAL FACILITIES TO USG. A SECOND GROMYKO VISIT AND LONG TOUTED BREZHNEV VISIT HAVE FOR TIME BEING QUIETLY BEEN SHELVED.

11. C. EGYPTIAN/ARAB RELATIONS: SPRING SAW ENERGETIC EFFORT ON PART OF SADAT TO GALVANIZE ARAB SUPPORT BEHIND EGYPTIAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS ME PEACE EFFORTS. THROUGH SAUDI AUSPICES, A RECONCILIATION OF SORTS TOOK PLACE WITH ASAD. SADAT REFUSED TO ACQUIESCE IN ASAD'S REQUEST THAT EGYPT TAKE NO PEACE STEPS WITHOUT SYRIA, BUT ADHERED TO GORE POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD ALSO BE SOME MOVE ON GOLAN AT APPROPRIATE TIME. EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN COORDINATION COMMITTEE WAS ESTABLISHED, NOMINALLY TO HARMONIZE FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES. SURFACE APPEARANCES NOTWITHSTANDING, MISTRUST BETWEEN SADAT AND ASAD PERSISTS. ON ONE HAND, ISRAELI PRESS LEAKS ABOUT

NEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOE REFUELED SYRIAN SUSPICIONS. ON  
OTHER, MID-JUNE SARG-GOJ COORDINATION AGREEMENT, WHILE PUBLICLY  
ENDORSED BY SADAT, HAS AROUSED EGYPTIAN SUSPICIONS THAT SYRIANS  
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ARE SEEKING TO FORM ARAB COUNTERFOIL TO EGYPT.

12. IN EFFORT ACHIEVE PRE-SALZBURG ARAB CONSENSUS, SADAT  
IN MID-MAY VISITED KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS AND AMMAN.  
TRIP WAS HISTORIC FIRST FOR ANY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT TO EITHER  
JORDAN OR IRAQ. RETURNING HOME AFTER ELEVEN-DAY TOUR, SADAT  
CLAIMED TO HAVE ACHIEVED TRIP'S PRIMARY GOAL: BASIC ARAB  
CONSENSUS WHICH WOULD ALLOW HIM TO SPEAK AT SALZBURG WITH  
CONFIDENCE AND CREDIBILITY AS ARAB LEADER RATHER THAN SOLEY  
AS EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT. SADAT'S UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT IN  
KUWAIT THAT ISRAEL BE ALLOWED EXIST WITHIN ITS '67 BORDERS  
DREW SOME CRITICISM FROM KUWAITI PARLIAMENT AND PALESTINIANS,  
BUT LED ELSEWHERE TO CAUTIOUSLY SIMILAR STATEMENTS.

13. RECURRENT PLO-PHALANGIST BATTLING THROUGHOUT REPORTING  
PERIOD AND RESULTANT LEGANESE CABINET CRISIS WORRIED GOE.  
SADAT OFFERED TO GO TO LEBANON TO ASSIST, BUT HAS KEPT  
INVOLVEMENT TO DISPATCHING SERIES OF MESSAGES TO LEBANESE  
LEADERS AND TO ARAFAT. WHEN BY END JUNE SITUATION SHOWED NO  
IMPROVEMENT, SADAT PUBLICLY WARNED PALESTINIANS TO ESCHEW  
INTERFERENCE IN TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY OF ITS ARAB HOSTS.

14. FED UP WITH PALESTINIANS, SADAT GAVE ARAFAT WHAT EGYPTIAN  
PRESIDENT DESCRIBED AS SEVERE DRESSING DOWN DURING FAISAL  
FUNERAL CONCLAVE LATE MARCH. AN APPARENTLY CHASTENED ARAFAT  
ARRIVED IN CAIRO WEEK LATER AND WENT OUT OF HIS WAY IN PUBLIC  
STATEMENTS DURING VISIT TO LAVISH PRAISE ON EGYPTIAN LEADER.  
IN FURTHER EFFORT PATCH UP RELATIONS WITH EGYPT, PLO SPOKESMAN  
GAMELY CAME TO DEFENSE OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT IN NAME OF  
ARAB SOLIDARITY AFTER VIRULENT PDLFP ATTACKS ON SADAT  
FROM LIBYAN ROSTRUM IN JUNE. SADAT'S EFFORTS TO CAJOLE  
PALESTINIANS INTO COMING TO AN AGREEMENT AMONG THEMSELVES  
ON REPRESENTATION AT GENEVA WERE LESS  
SUCCESSFUL. ALTHOUGH HE CAREFULLY MAINTAINED PUBLIC  
POSITION THAT THIS WAS QUESTION ONLY PALESTINIANS COULD  
DECIDE, HE WENT PUBLIC IN MID-JUNE WITH CALL FOR FORMATION  
OF PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT  
SADAT'S ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE ISSUE WILL SUCCEED.

15. RELATIONS WITH LIBYA WENT FROM BAD TO WORSE, OPENING  
WITH SADAT'S RETALIATION AGAINST LARG'S VIRULENT PERSONALIZED  
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MUDSLINGING, CLIMAXING WITH SHOCK OF LATE-MAY ANNOUNCEMENT OF LARG/SOVIET ARMS DEAL, AND CLOSING WITH UNLIKELY BUT EXPEDIENT ANTI-SADAT ALLIANCE BETWEEN QADHAAFI'S MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS AND PFLP'S PALESTINIAN MARXISTS. ASIDE FROM SOVIET ARMS DEAL, GOE CONCENTRATED GREATEST CONCERN ON REPORTED LARG ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT BORDER TRIBES AND TO INFILTRATE POTENTIAL ASSASSINS INTO EGYPT. PREDICTABLY, EGYPTIAN PRESS PICKED UP LATE JUNE NEWSWEEK STORY THAT QADHAAFI HAD GIVEN GEORGE HABBASH 16 MILLION DOLLARS TO FINANCE SABOTAGE AND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS WITHIN EGYPT. SADAT AT SAME TIME ACCUSED QADHAAFI OF USING LIBYAN MONEY TO FAN PLO/PHALANGIST FIRES IN LEGANON. SADAT HAS CONCLUDED QADHAAFI'S ANIMOSITY IS IRREVOCABLE AND THAT LIBYAN LEADER MUST GO. HOW THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED REMAINS IN DOUBT.

16. D. EGYPTIAN/EUROPEAN RELATIONS: EGYPTIAN SENSE, OF SELF-IMPORTANCE BOOSTED BY PROCESSION OF EUROPEAN VIPS TREKKING TO CAIRO. IN ADDITION TO ROMANIAN PRESIDENT, GREEK, YUGOSLAV, WEST GERMAN, ITALIAN, HUNGARIAN, NORWEGIAN AND ROMANIAN FORMERS VISITING CAIRO BETWEEN APRIL AND JUNE. EACH LAUDED SADAT'S REOPENING OF CANL, MADE USUAL STATEMENTS ON ME PEACE, AND CONCLUDED VARIOUS INDUSTRIAL, ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND TRADE AGREEMENTS.

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17. AT END OF MAY, SADAT PAID PROTOCOL VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA AND AUSTRIA ENROUTE TO SALZBURG SUMMIT AND THEN SENT HIS FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS VICE PRESIDENT ON EUROPEAN MISSIONS LATER IN JUNE. FAHMY'S TRIP TO LONDON CULMINATED IN ANNOUNCEMENT THAT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN PRINCIPLE FOR ARMS PURCHASES FROM UK AMOUNTING TO 450 MILLION POUNDS STERLING, THROUGH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ASHRAF MARWAN LATER PUBLICLY DENIED ANY DECISION TAKEN ON THIS SCORE.

18. E. MISCELLANEOUS: GOE WAS ALSO ACTIVE ON OTHER FRONTS. RELATIONS WITH IRAN WERE FURTHER STRENGTHENED WHTN SADAT MADE SURPRISE VISIT TO TEHRAN ON APRIL 23, FOLLOWING RIYADH  
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SUMMIT. SADAT INVITED YOUNG IRANIAN CROWN PRINCE TO SHARE TOP PUBLIC BILLING WITH HIM AT SUEZ CANAL REOPENING CEREMONIES IN PORT SAID, THEREBY AROUSING SOME PIQUE ON PART OF SAUDIS AND PERHAPS OTHERS. IN LATE JUNE PRIMIN/MINWAR GAMASY MADE TRIP TO IRAN TO BE RECEIVED BY SHAH AND CONSULT WITH COUNTERPARTS.

19. JOINING STREAM OF VIPS, INDONESIAN AND INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTERS TROOPED TO CAIRO IN APRIL, WHILE ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS PAID STATE VISIT TWO MONTHS LATER. IN RETURN FOR MAKARIOS' SUPPORT FOR GOE POSITION IN ME PEACENEGOTIATIONS AND CONCOMITANT RECOGNITION OF PLO AS SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS, SADAT REITERATED HIS ENDORSEMENT OF ARCHBISHOP'S SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM, VIS. WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY FORCES AND RETURN OF REFUGEES. TURKS ARE DISPLEASED WITH GOE POSITION AND PRIVATELY COMPLAIN SADAT SHOULD BACK FELLOW MUSLIM STATE, BUT ALSO RECOGNIZE SADAT'S ANNOYANCE AT RECENT TURKISH OVERTURES TOWARD LIBYA.

20 PART II - INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

ON DOMESTIC SCENE, THREE EVENTS DOMINATED QUARTER:  
INSTALLATION OF NEW CABINET MID-APRIL, DESIGNATION OF AIR



MARSHAL MUBARAK AS NEW VICE PRESIDENT AND PUTATIVE EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR TO SADAT, AND REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL. ON LESS PUBLICIZED LEVEL, MOMENT OF TRUTH ARRIVED FOR GOE AS SERIOUS LIQUIDITY AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS COULD NO LONGER BE IGNORED.

21. ON APRIL 14, HEGAZY GOVERNMENT, LONG UNDER PUBLIC ATTACK FOR INEFFECTUACY AND (LESS JUSTIFIABLY) CORRUPTION, RESIGNED. THREE DAYS LATER SADAT APPOINTED FORMER DEPUTY/PRIMIN/MIN INTERIOR MAMDUH SALIM AS NEW PRIMIN WITH FAHMY AND GAMASY AS TWO PRINCIPAL DEPUTY PRIMINS. NEW CABINET, UNDER SALIM'S DIRECTION, WAS CHARGED WITH REDUCING COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC ILLS AND REINVIGORATING MORIBUND ECONOMIC OPEN DOOR POLICY. EGYPTIANS PLACIDLY ACCEPTED CHANGE, THOUGH NOT WITHOUT SOME RAISED EYEBROWS THAT "POLICEMEN" SHOULD HAVE BEEN NAMED PRIMIN. SALIM GOVERNMENT CONTAINS SOME NEW TALENT, BUT LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, SUFFERS FROM JURISDICTIONAL FRAGMENTATION AND OVERLAP IN ECONOMIC SECTOR AND LACKS OVERALL  
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ECONOMIC CZAR. A STRONG LEADER, SALIM MUST NEVERTHELESS COPE WITH ENTRENCHED EGYPTIAN BUREAUCRACY, WHICH RESENTS AND RESISTS REFORM MEASURES. IF EFFECTIVENESS OF SALIM GOVERNMENT REMAINS UNTESTED, ITS STYLE REFLECTS GREATER DYNAMISM. LENGTHY LISTS OF DECISIONS, OSTENSIBLY TAKEN TO REDRESS NATION'S ECONOMIC ILLS, REGULARLY FLOW FROM ITS MARATHON SESSIONS. UNURED TO EMPTY PROMISES, EGYPTIAN PUBLIC IS RESTIVELY WANTING ACTION RATHER THAN WORDS.

22. DESIGNATION OF MUBARAK AS NEW VP CAME AS SURPRISE. YOUNG, WELL LIKED AND RESPECTED AS AIR FORCE C/S, HE HAD NO PREVIOUS GROUNDING OR INTEREST IN POLITICS. APPOINTMENT MADE TO TIE MILITARY FORCES CLOSER TO SADAT, AS SIGNAL THAT NEW GENERATION OF TECHNICALLY TRAINED YOUTH HAS PLACE IN SADAT GOVERNMENT, AND AS PERSONAL RECOGNITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF OCTOBER WAR "HEROES". SINCE BECOMING VP, MUBARAK HAS BECOME A REGULAR, IF USUALLY MUTE, PARTICIPANT IN ALL HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS. MANY REGARD HIM AS SADAT'S CHOICE FOR EVENTUAL SUCCESSOR AT SUCH TIME AS PRESIDENT CHOOSES TO STEP DOWN. NEW VP IS STILL LEARNING THE POLITICAL ROPES AND IS AS YET WITHOUT DEMONSTRABLE INFLUENCE ON DECISION MAKING PROCESSES.

23. TRUE TO HIS WORD, SADAT REOPENED SUEZ CANAL ON JUNE 5 IN ELABORATELY STAGED CEREMONIES. DATE, MARKING EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY OF DISASTROUS 1967 ISARELI PREMPTIVE STRIEK, WAS SYMBOLICAL. TO WORLD EVENT HERALDED AS ACT OF STATES-MANSHIP; TO EGYPTIANS AS ONE OF FRUITS OF OCTOBER, 1973 "VICTORY". EQUALLY IMPORTANT ARE ANTICIPATED REVENUES, WHICH GOE HOPES MAY REACH \$300-450 MILLION PER YEAR.

24. TRY AS IT MAY, GOE COULD NO LONGER HIDE FROM SERIOUS LIQUIDITY/BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEMS. AGGREGATING L.E. 1.5 BILLION (\$3.5 BILLION), CRISIS GENERATED BY SURGE OF IMPORTS TO MEET LONG PENT UP CONSUMER DEMAND OF A PUBLIC WHICH NO LONGER CONSIDERS ITSELF AT WAR. POLITICAL STABILITY, IN SADAT'S VIEW, DEPENDS UPON GOE'S ABILITY PROVIDE AT LEAST MINIMAL CONSUMER'S GOODS. SLUGGISH INTERNATIONAL COTTON MARKET SHARPLY REDUCED ANTICIPATED GOE HARD CURRENCY INCOME, REQUIRING RESORT TO SHORT TERM, HIGH INTEREST BANKERS' FACILITIES. WITH THESE DUE OR ABOUT TO BECOME SO, GOE LACKED CASH TO PAY. AS MINIFINANCE DRAMATICALLY TOLD MEETING OF HEADS OF EGYPTIAN  
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PUBLIC SECTOR COMPANIES, LIQUIDITY CRISIS IS MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO EGYPT'S SOLVENCY SINCE 1880'S (SHADES OF KHEDIVE ISMAIL\*) WHILE SEEKING FOREIGN (INCLUDING US) HELP TO OVERCOME PROBLEM, GOE REMAINS RELUCTANT FOR POLITICAL REASONS IMPLEMENT AN AUSTERITY PROGRAM. KNOWLEDGE OF MULTI-LATEAL DONOR ASSISTANCE HAS AT LEAST TEMPORARILY BROUGHT RENEWED CONFIDENCE IN EGYPT'S CREDITWORTHINESS, YET IN ABSENCE STRINGENT DOMESTIC CONTROLS ON IMPORTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT, PROBLEM COULD PLAGUE GOE FOR SOME TIME.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, QUARTERLY REPORTS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, PEACE PLANS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 JUL 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
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**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
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**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** GolinoFR  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 01 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <01 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <07 APR 2003 by GolinoFR>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** QUARTERLY POLITICAL ASSESSMENT: APRIL 1 - JUNE 30, 1975  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PINT, EG, UR, US, XF  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006